A time remembered

[Bordegar]

They serve-----

Here i wait as blue clouds are above and songs of nature in throngs of harmonies vibrantly in hope's calls grow into a crescendo's call, a chorus of awe at its creators hands so filling the springs new year with life and new growth. In the meantime the noises above are not so friendly and groans oft without warning loudly dispel calmer thoughts.

Heavy engines clatter loudly above and distant pump pump sounds soon break into slashes so near as your skin crawls with unknown outcomes and sweat is your constant state of existence. Alarm!!! Alarm!! as voices raise in harsh pitch, bells loudly sing and distant sounds grow louder and you shudder as your horizon becomes dazed and you hold onto anything that is able to support your feeble frame against such terrors. In mercy sometimes you may see a calmer face starring at you a wry grin or some quick wit usually followed by obscenities loudly raised to break sheer agonies as fears grips like a vice imposing its domain. Other times, darkness and smell of diesel and hearing ruptured pipes are your only relief to take your mind captive as your boat becomes a coffin yet your aware of all things.

Life as a sub-mariner is never a choice of a sane man, who would endure thus in sanity's calm yet war is never a sane choice made by rational reasoning as more imposed due to debts unpaid and ideologies opposed amassed at crossroads already proven wrong yet argued vainly.

[Bordegar]

They served


U,461, a 1600-ton supply U-boat, commanded by Korvettenkapitän Wolf STIEBLER, was sunk at 1205 on 30th July, 1943, in position 450 42' N. 0110 00' W., by Sunderland "U" of 461 Squadron, R.A.A.F., assisted by Halifax "B" of 502 Squadron and U.S.A. Liberator "O" of 53 Squadron. At the time, U.461 was outward bound in company with U.462, who was also sunk (N.I.D. NOTE: See C.B. 04051 (82)) and a U-boat commanded by Kapitänleutnant LUIS. Survivors from U.461 and U.462 were picked up by "WOODPECKER" of the Second Support Group.

U.461 was on her sixth patrol when sunk. During the eighteen months since her commissioning, she had supplied U-boats eighty times.

Of U.461's complement of sixty, fifteen survived. These included the Captain, the First Lieutenant and a Midshipman

Korvettenkapitän Wolf STIEBLER, aged 36, is of the 1932 term. He had been in U-boats since before the war. Although STIEBLER, himself, was silent on the point, prisoners previously captured have intimated that he was in command of U.21, a 250-ton U-boat interned in Norway on 28th March, 1940. The U-boat was later recaptured by the Germans and STIEBLER released from internment. There was much speculation among U-boat officers at the time as to whether STIEBLER would be court-martial but he managed to extricate himself from the affair. STIEBLER is a bluff, hearty man and he was popular on board. He was security conscious on naval matters.

Oberleutnant zur See Herbert LUDWIG, the First Lieutenant, was injured at the time of sinking and at the time this report was written he was still too ill to be interrogated. He was 39 years of age.

Leutnant zur See FALK, the Second Lieutenant, did not survive. He was of the 1938 Naval term.

Oberfähnrich Carston SCHRÖCK, aged 20 and Acting Third Watch Keeping Officer, was unwilling to discuss his career in any way. He was a typical Hitler Youth product.

Very little is known of Oberleutnant (Ing.) MAHNKOPF, the Senior Engineer Officer, who did not survive. He does not appear in the 1940 Navy List. He had taken part in all of U.461's patrols. He was assisted by a Leutnant (Ing.) WALDORF, who was sailing in U.461 for the first time. This officer did not survive.

Marinestabsarzt Dr. GERD, who was sailing in the U-boat was not among the survivors. Nothing is known about him.

The average age of the ten other ratings who survived was barely twenty. The surviving Supply Petty Officer was aged twenty-five and the Chief Stoker who survived was twenty-nine.


If interested can give breakdown of full naval report on these boats..

[Bordegar]

SIXTH AND LAST PATROL OF U.461.

U.461 Sails from Bordeaux but is Forced to Put Back.

U.461 first sailed from Bordeaux on 22nd July 1943. It was originally intended that she should sail with U.459 and U.117. The three U-boats rendezvoused in the mouth of the Gironde, but U.461 discovered a leak in Diving Tank No. 6 and put back to Bordeaux where defects were made good. The damage had originally been caused by an ocean-going tanker which had fouled U.461 during bad weather when mooring at Bordeaux.

U.461 Sails.

U.461 finally sailed from Bordeaux at noon on 28th July, 1943, in company with U.462 (Oberleutnant zur See der Reserve Bruno Vowe) and one other supply U-boat, thought by prisoners to have been either U.460 (Oberleutnant zur See der Reserve Schnorr), or U.119.

Escort consisted of between nine and twelve nits, including three Narvik Class destroyers, One Sperrbrecher, and six more minesweepers. Periodically flights of Ju.88 aircraft provided air cover.

A U-boat in Company Puts Back; U.504 Joins.

On the following day the third supply U-boat developed a faulty clutch and put back to Bordeaux. Her place was taken by U.504, a 740 ton U-boat commanded by Kapitänleutnant Luis, who was outward bound from another base.

Escort remained with the U-boats until 2300 on 29th July. The three U-boats remained together throughout that night. U.461 was the "leader" boat of the formation and either flashed or semaphored action to be taken to the other two.


SINKING OF U.461.

Aircraft Sighted: the U-boats Remain Surfaced.

On the morning of 30th July, 1943, the three U-boats were proceeding on a course of 2500T., surfaced and at a speed of about 19 knots.

According to the Captain of U.461, a Sunderland was sighted at 0950. This aircraft kept at 5,000 yards distance, out of range of A/A fire. It was heard signalling for other aircraft. A liberator or Halifax then appeared, followed by what was taken to be another Halifax and another aircraft, until there were eventually five in all.

(N.I.D. NOTE: Sunderland "U" of 461 Squadron, R.A.A.F., reported sighting three U-boats at 1148 with Halifax "B" of 502 Squadron and a U.S.A. Liberator circling. At this time an attack was being made on U.462 by the Halifax, three A/S bombs falling off the starboard quarter and exploding in one big plume. Sunderland "U" of 461 Squadron then ran in to attack the same U-boat from astern. The three U-boats turned to bring all guns to bear and put up such a heavy barrage that the aircraft was compelled to break away. Sunderland "U" of 461 Squadron then endeavored to get ahead of the U-boats in order to make a bow attack, but the entire pack wheeled inside the aircraft's turning circle, preventing the attack. Halifax "S" of 502 Squadron then made an attack on U.462, dropping a single A/S bomb from 3,000 feet, having approached from dead astern. This was a near miss.

At noon a Liberator attacked unsuccessfully, but drew the fire from all three boats. Taking advantage of this, Sunderland "U" of 461 Squadron attacked.

U.461 Attacked and Sunk.
Korvettenkapitän Stiebler said that at the moment of this attack he attempted a turn to port; he was unable to turn to starboard owing to the short distance between him and U.462. Machine gun fire from the Sunderland was very heavy and severely wounded one or two of his officers and killed both the leading members of the 20 mm. quadruple gun, which reduced the effectiveness of A/A action. He thought the aircraft attacked from dead astern. Two bombs or depth charges fell to one side of the U-boat and two to the other. It was two which fell forward of the conning tower and exploded beneath the U-boat which caused the fatal damage. U.461 went down like a stone.

The gunlayer of the port single 20 mm. gun said that he fired until the aircraft was 60 feet away and then his ammunition ran out.

The sole survivor to escape from inside the U-boat said that five aircraft were reported one after the other. Suddenly there was a tremendous explosion and a wall of water rushed into the control room from forward. The prisoner thought that the bows had been blown off. He is a strong athletic type and said that it was only with the greatest exertion that he managed to haul himself up through the conning tower hatch, for water was already pouring down it. He was preceded only by a Propaganda Company camera man, a supernumerary on board, who, however, later disappeared. When he arrived on the bridge Stiebler had already ordered everyone to abandon ship.

(N.I.D. NOTE: Aircraft "U" of 461 Squadron reported running in from port quarter to starboard bow, at 50 degrees to the axis of the U-boat, at 50 feet. The aircraft was free of A/A fire until closing to 1,000 yards. At this range the nose gunner opened fire on the A/A gunners on the rear gun-platform of the U-boat, scoring direct hits. A stick of seven depth charges set to 25 feet, spaced 60 feet, was dropped and straddled the U-boat. All exploded, the centre of the stick being just forward of the conning tower. As the aircraft passed over the U-boat, the tail gunner fired 600 rounds, scoring numerous hits. By this time the aircraft was flying into a heavy barrage put up by the other two U-boats, causing the pilot to take such violent evasive action that details of the U-boat attacked could not be fully observed. The navigator, however, observed the U-boat slide forward under the water, with quantities of orange coloured froth and scum issuing, apparently from the fore part. When the aircraft completed the circuit up to thirty men were seen swimming in the orange patch of scum still in evidence. The aircraft dropped a dinghy to survivors. It was seen to inflate and several survivors eventually climbed aboard.)

U.461 sank at approximately 1205 in position 45042'N., 011000'W. For the continuance of this action, which resulted in the destruction of U.462, and the probable destruction of the U-boat commanded by Kapitänleutnant Luis.

Survivors from U.461 were picked up, some five hours after sinking by H.M.S. "WOODPECKER".

[Bordegar]

WAR LOGS March 1941



1.3.
In Operational area:

a) U 70, 108, 552, 95 in operations areas between 590 and 620 and between 140 and 170 30'.
b) U 99 and U 147 receive the following operations areas as from 1.3:
U 99 40 seamile wide channels south of the boats given above.
U 47 area west of Rockall Bank.
c) U 97 as weather boat between 220 and 250 south of 580 N.
d) U 147 between Shetlands and Faroes.

On outward passage in Operational Area:

a) U 37 to the north, approximately grid BF 41.
b) UA in the North Sea.
c) U 74 in Bergen, where it is practising for a few days.
d) U 105, 124 and 106 on outward passage to supply Culebra.

On return passage:

U 46 to St. Nazaire, U 69 and U 107 are putting in to Lorient.

Very few boats will be ready for action in March: U 100 on about 5.3., U 48 on 15.3., U 52 on 21.3., in addition, the boats frozen up in the Baltic, U 76, U 98 and U 110 which can now be brought through to Kiel.

Naval War Staff have agreed to the south boats extending the operational area south of 300 N to 250 W. They have received orders to proceed to the south on 210 to 220 after replenishment of supplies which is planned for 3, 4 and 5.3. Traffic is presumed to be here, and this is born out by a new intelligence report.

2.3.

One of the two aircraft detailed for reconnaissance to the N. returning to Stavanger, reported a convoy at 1030 in AM 2920 (inexact). The course was given as west, only after further enquiry. The position was improved by the report of a bombed steamer in AM 2991. This position was assumed to be correct.
The convoy should be intercepted by the boats early in the morning. U 70, 108, 552, 95, 99, 47 are to take up reconnaissance lines from AL 3794 to 6259, at 1000. 2 Italian boats are to extend the flanks. In this way, assuming a convoy speed of 9 knots, and if the course lies between 2500 and 2900, the boats will be ahead of the convoy.


Air reconnaissance by 3 aircraft at 1000, between 1510 and 1645 W. The boats received orders to report position and D/F direction on picking up aircraft beacon signals, and only to operate when ordered to do so. (Experiences of 20.2 and report U 96 of 28.2.). U 37 is detailed as weather boat and informed of the traffic confirmed in AL 42 and 51 by U 123. U 97 received orders, therefore, to return (the boat has only upper deck torpedoes).

3.3.

Aerial reconnaissance saw nothing of the convoy. It is questionable which position the aircraft has in fact reached, with the uncertain fix. It is still possible that the area to the south of the reconnaissance lines is covered. It is also possible that the convoy carried out an evasive movement after the air attack on 2.3 probably followed by one to the north. The reconnaissance lines were transferred 10 seamiles on a northerly course, when the possibility of this had been confirmed on a request for a weather report. The reconnaissance lines are to proceed until 2400 and then remain stationary as patrol lines in order to exhaust the possibilities of the situation up to dawn on 4.3 and until the appearance of air reconnaissance. It is still possible owing to weather conditions, that the convoy has not passed the longitude of the patrol lines. The situation strengthens suspicion to a conviction, that the convoys react to air attacks by greatly altering course - a course which must have seemed obvious to the English, with the development of cooperation between aircraft and U-boat.

In this connection, therefore, KG 40 is only to attack isolated vessels, convoys though are to be shadowed if possible unobserved, and not attacked. A lamentable, but necessary restriction. It remains to be seen how such questions should be decided after the statement of the "Fliegerführer Atlantic" under C-in-C G.A.F. Whether an unobserved shadowing is altogether possible with the large Condor aircraft also remains to be seen.

U 552 reported heavy traffic from AM 12 and 21, U 147 between Minch and Faroe Bank. After carrying out convoy operations this locality will again be occupied.

U 69, 107 and 73 report on their operations. U 69 (3 ships of 25,956 tons) and U 107 (4 ships of 21,000 tons) have achieved very encouraging results for a first operation. U 73 (1 ship of 6,500 tons) was temporarily stationed below Iceland but encountered only fishing craft and coastal sailing vessels.

4.3.
The Condor returning from Stavanger reported a convoy putting out in AM 2554, course 3000 at 0900. The composition is the same as that of the convoy of 2.3. It is possible that this is the same convoy, which, owing to the especially unfavourable weather conditions, has been lying practically hove to.

The convoy cannot now be reached before darkness. The available boats, including UA 70, 47, 99, 95 and 108 and 552 are to be in patrol lines from AL 3122 to 3585 at 1000 on 5.3. and on a course of 1150 and a speed of 10 knots run across the convoy which with a speed of 9 knots must be ahead of the patrol channels. A Italian boat is on the southern flank.

U 46 put into St. Nazaire, has had no contact with the enemy, U 147 has begun return passage to Germany.
U 124 has carried out supply from Culebra.

5.3.
U 74 has put out of Bergen for the operational area.

U 105 has carried out supplying from Culebra. U 95 reported by W/T from the centre of the ordered patrol lines, having fired torpedoes and sunk tonnage amounting to 27,000 tons. The sending of this superfluous W/T message from the patrol channel was an extremely clumsy mistake, when the boat was not already with certainty observed by the enemy.

The reconnaissance lines did not bring any success up to the hours of darkness. Up to now than, all attempts to operate on aircraft reports have remained without success, (except in the case U 73 and U 96 on 22.2.1941). The reasons are as follows:

a) Insufficient reliability of aircraft positions. A deviation of 70 seamiles on 20.2. must be attributed to the D/Fing of U 96. In addition, it may be suspected that on this, and the days following, the aircraft positions were incorrect, the radio interception reports correct.
b) With the former method, the aircraft reports only gave one position, and the course given might only be that steered at the time.

c) For the most part, the U-boats detailed for operations could not intercept the target until the next day. During this long interval the first report will have decreased in reliability. Also, the uncertainty resulting from this cannot be compensated for, even by the operation of a wide U-boat rake.


Another method of co-operation must therefore be found in order to obtain a more exact position and course of the target from the reports of several U-boats in succession. Until this has been tried out there will be no more U-boat operations undertaken on aircraft reports. In spite of this, aircraft reconnaissance is important in the area not covered by U-boats.

Ordered for Bomber Squadron 40's operations:

a) Routine flights daily, with at least two aircraft if possible, reconnaissance west and northwest of Ireland.
b) Take off at intervals of 1 to 2 hours on the same flying route.
c) Convoys are the target. These are to be reported as quickly as possible (for the time being course and speed). Contact is to be maintained as long as fuel supply allows.
d) The second, and all following aircraft fly to the convoy reported by the previous aircraft and make their own complete reconnaissance report according to paragraph c). The report of the first aircraft can be checked by that of the second. Each aircraft must therefore report according to his own navigation, regardless of the report sent by his predecessor.
e) Convoys may be attacked until further notice.

The various short wave D/F stations will be detailed to take bearings on the reporting aircraft to check the position reports.

The boats were assigned to the following new operational areas:

U 70 and U 99, lines in the vicinity of AM 11
U 47 lines in the vicinity of AM 13
U 108 lines in the vicinity of AM 15
U 552 West of Rockall Bank

These are the areas in which according to the latest report the most traffic may be expected.

U 95 received orders to return.

6.3.
U 95 reported that yesterday, instead of proceeding on a course of 1150, speed 15 knots, from the patrol lines, it remained there. That the convoy escaped through the resulting gap, is not entirely out of the question, but very unlikely.
U 106 has carried out replenishment of supplies. The supplying of three boats in Culebra apparently went without a hitch.

The three boats in the south received orders to proceed to the south on 20, 21 and 220, thereby raking the presumed main traffic route.

Of the boats in the north, U 108 started upon the return passage; it has sunk 2 ships of altogether 12,061 tons. U 74 is assigned to the operational area north of the remaining boats; U 37, formerly weather boat, is to occupy U 108's area, UA is to be weather boat.


7.3.
The commanding officer of U 97, Lieutenant Heilmann, reported on putting in. His boat sank 2 ships of 16,000 tons reported by U 552 on 23.2, also damaged a tanker of 11,000 tons; apart from this though, there were again 5 entirely inexplicable failures.

U 47 contacted a north-bound convoy in AM 1452 on the evening of 6.3., and maintained contact until 0440. U 99, 70 and UA were detailed to operate on the convoy, also U 37, although this boat was however, some distance away. Only U 70 reported on request that it had come up to the convoy. Further reports are lacking for the time being. U 70 and U 47 have not replied to their call up.
Torpedoed according to Radio Intelligence report:


at 0747 Athelbeach 6,568 tons (twice torpedoed)
at 0632 Mydrecht 7,493 tons
at 0604 Delilian 6,423 tons

Towards 2200, UA presumably contacted the same convoy in AL 3153 and reported again at 0025. U 37 requested D/F signals, and must also be in the vicinity. No other messages have come in, but the steamer "Empire Attendance", however, was torpedoed nearby.


According to a position report, U 99 is not in the convoy area, but probably further to the east, where it has presumably sunk the whale factory "Terje Viken" of 20,638 tons, which reported sinking after torpedo attack.

U 74 intercepted a S.E. bound convoy in AE 8945 at 0246 on 8.3. U 99 was detailed to operate on this. The last message from U 74 on this convoy was originated at 1106, presumably the boat was subsequently forced to submerge.

At 1410 a message was received from the Fleet reporting a convoy on a northerly course in DT 90. The Fleet units i.e. Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, are maintaining contact apparently without attacking owing to the presence of an enemy battleship. For the boats U 124, U 105, U 106, still to the north proceeding to the south, this is a particularly favorable situation. They must be able to approach, and should, if possible, attack the battleship in order to give our ships the chance to attack.



tbc......

[SubCruiser]

Great work, Bordegar!

[Bordegar]

Cont..

WAR LOGS March 1941

8.3.

U 124 and U 105 report that they are up with the battleship's convoy and U 124 later reported having sunk 5 ships of altogether 33,000 tons. In the evening a message was received from U 106 reporting that it was still further to the north. The battleships reported that they were withdrawing to the west, after enemy movements were indicated from Radio Interception reports. Contact was broken off.

U 74 reported the convoy putting in far to the north, attacks were not observed.


UA reported the sinking of a steamer sailing in the convoy U 47/UA, also considerable damage after depth-charge attack, the boat, however is able to carry out its duties. There is no point in pursuing this convoy further; UA and U 37 receive operational areas between 59 and 620 N. Reports have not come in from U 70 and U 47.


On the request of the Naval War Staff, U 552 and U 95 are to be disposed 300 seamiles north-west and south-west of the Northern Channel as weather boats, in preparation for air attacks during the full-moon period between 10 and 20.3; a considerable "freezing" of forces for this subsidiary purpose.

9.3.

U 74 reports having lost contact. U 74 and U 99 receive operations areas between 59 and 620 with U 37, while UA is to be withdrawn further to the west. For the time being therefore the operations in the north have come to a standstill. U 70 and U 47 were again requested to send a situation report in the evening, but without result. Both boats are causing great anxiety, as they have not yet replied to the request made on the evening of the 7th. There is still hope that this silence is only due to W/T breakdown, especially in the case of U 47, which had already experienced a breakdown on this trip.


Of the south boats, U 105 reports the sinking of a steamer of 10,000 tons. A further search with such small forces seemed pointless after the withdrawal of the battleships. U 124, which has used most torpedoes, is to replenish supplies from Ship 41 in position Red on 16.3; U 105 and 106 are to proceed for the time being to the Freetown area.

10.3.

U 147 put into Heligoland. U 552 is to start upon its return passage in 48 hours. UA is to take over as weather boat.

An incomplete short signal giving position was picked up, but not repeated on request. This could possibly have been originated by U 70, more likely by U 47.

Reichs Minister Todt is in Lorient.

In addition to previous plans, shelter berths are to be constructed in La Pallice and the necessary permission is to be obtained from O.K.M. For one thing these are necessary because in the course of the summer, the repair facilities in St. Nazaire, Lorient and Brest will be absolutely exhausted. La Pallice can provide space for the simultaneous repair of 9 to 10 boats. Apart from this I propose the fullest possible development of Lorient which according to experts has a capacity of 30, Brest and St. Nazaire 20 boats each. Shelter berths are also proposed for the Norwegian bases Bergen and Trondheim, there are no difficulties as regards the Organization Todt.

11.3.
It is apparent from U 147's short message that traffic proceeds from the Minch via grid 2265 to the west. U 74 and 99, both of which are in this area have been informed accordingly.


12.3.
U 108 has put into Lorient.


UA was forced to begin the return passage owing to depth charge damage; U 37 has taken over as weather boat. The fantastic position therefore arises whereby of 4 boats stationed in the northern operational area (U 74, 99, 37, 95) two are detailed for weather service and therefore at a great disadvantage while one of these is even at sea without torpedoes exclusively for meteorological work. U 70 and 47 are not taken into consideration here.


U 37 sighted 3 destroyers in its operational area.


The supplying of U 124 has been postponed to 15.3. U 105 and 106 are to be supplied on about 25.3. It is hoped that before then at least the 13 torpedoes on Ship 41 can be taken off, at present this is not possible.

13.3.
U 98 has put out from Brunsbüttel for the operational area. U 551 has put into Bergen to carry out several exercises before putting out on operations. Otherwise nothing to report.

14.3.

U 110 has received the the area between 620 30' N. and 590 N. and between 190 and 230 W.; penetration as far as the coast of Iceland is left to this boat.

As relief for the south weather boat U 95, presumably leaving on 15 March. U 74 has received orders to proceed to this area and to send weather reports from 000 on 16th.

tbc.

[Bordegar]

Cont..

WAR LOGS March 1941

15.3.

I. In operational area:
a) Northwest of Northern Channel:
U 110 between 620 30' N. and 590 N. and between 190 and 230 W.
U 74 line between 610 48' N. and 600 54' N., east of 200 W.
U 99 south of this to 600 N., east of 200 W.
U 37 between 580 N. and 600 N. and between 13 and 200 W., at the same time northerly weather boat.
U 95 southern half of grid AL as southerly weather boat.

Outward bound:
U 100 - AF 7580; U 98 - AN 3110

On return passage:
UA - BE 2300; U 552 - BF 4550.

b) In southern area:
Southward bound, roughly:
U 105 - ES 33; U 106 - EK 71 and U 124 - ER 56; also presumably, position intended for supplying.
c) In Lorient: U 38, 43, 52, 65, 69, 73, 93, 94, 97, 101, 103, 107, 108, 123.
In St. Nazaire: U 46 (proposes to put out on 15.3); U 48; U 96.
d) Probably ready for action up to the 1st April:
U 46, 48, 69, 551, 97, 52, 101, 73, 107, 94, 103 and U 76, recently arrived from home waters.
e) Italian U-boats:
In operational areas:

J 17 -AL 2650
J 26 -AL 2890
J 27 -AL 6230
J 23 -AL 6270
J 22 -AL 6810
J 19 -AL 9120
J 2 -GF 3450
In Bordeaux/Pauillac:
U 1, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 15, 16, 20, 24, 25, 14.

Operational area assigned:
U 100 the area between 6 and 100 W. and between 58 and 620 N.
U 147 has confirmed heavy traffic in this area, above all on the line grid AM 3395 - AM 2265, and from here to the west.

U 99, in addition to the area preciously allocated, an east to west channel 54 seamiles wide, to the north and south of it.

The Naval War Staff has announced that weather reporting by two boats (N.W. and S.W. of the Northern Channel) will probably be necessary up to the 20th March.

U 106 established contact with a convoy on a northerly course in grid EK 7473 at 2110. It may be presumed, from a U-boat warning sent at 1600 in EK 7710, that an attack had already taken place. The boat received instructions to direct U 105 (in the vicinity) to the scene of action. Contact was maintained throughout the day.

Ship 41 reported the transfer, owing to the weather conditions, of U 124's supply area to grid ER 89.

U 110 contacted a convoy putting in in grid AE 7983, course 90 degrees at 2353.

U 46 put out of St. Nazaire for the operational area.


(signed): DÖNITZ.

NOTE: Last Orders before sinking of U99 (scuttled after surfacing) and U100 (Rammed+DC'ed) during the night of 16th-17th March 1941 The newspapers of the day of this months patrols gives insight to the fears, anxieties, sorrows and relief and the much muted fortunes of war.

March 1941 Memorial

7 Flotilla
VIIB U47 Missing since 7 March, 1941 in North Atlantic south of Iceland in approximate position 60.00N/19.00W. 45 dead (all hands lost).

10 Patrol Reports:
30 ships sunk, total tonnage 162,769 GRT
1 warship sunk, total tonnage 29,150 tons
8 ships damaged, total tonnage 62,751 GRT

VIIC U70 Sunk 7 March, 1941 south-east of Iceland, in position 60.15N, 14.00W, by British corvettes HMS Camellia and HMS Arbutus. 20 dead and 25 survivors.

1 Patrol Report:
1 ship sunk, total tonnage 820 GRT
3 ships damaged, total tonnage 20,484 GRT

VIIB U99 Scuttled at 0343hrs on 17 Mar. 1941 SE of Iceland in approximate position 61N, 12W, after being depth charged by the British destroyer HMS Walker. 3 dead and 40 survivors.

8 Patrol Reports:
35 ships sunk, total tonnage 198,218 GRT
3 Armed Merchants (HMS prefix) sunk, total tonnage 46,440 GRT
1 ship captured, total tonnage 2,136 GRT
5 ships damaged, total tonnage 37,965 GRT

VIIB U100 Sank at 0318hrs on 17 March, 1941 south-east of Iceland, in approximate position 61N, 12W, after being rammed and depth charged by the British destroyers HMS Walker and HMS Vanoc. 38 dead and 6 survivors.

6 Patrol Reports:
25 ships sunk, total tonnage 135,614 GRT
4 ships damaged, total tonnage 17,229 GRT
1 ship a total loss, total tonnage 2,205 GRT

VIIC U551 Sunk 23 March, 1941 in the North Atlantic south-east of Iceland, in position 62.37N, 16.47W, by depth charges from the British ASW trawler HMS Visenda. 45 dead (all hands lost).

1 Patrol Report:
No ships sunk or damaged

[Bordegar]

COLLINGWOOD VERNON SHOREDITCH and EAST Stations advised by Admiralty for considerations of SOTD

Naval Intelligence ASW-TR Division


Overviews and Advisements forwarded

(A.) TORPEDOES

(i) Introductory.
1. The information given below is not confined to those torpedoes of which we have actual specimens, but is all supported by strong evidence, and where necessary probability values are indicated in the text.
It is emphasized that C.B.1815 remains the authority on torpedoes and that any subsequent amendments will appear in that book.
2. U-boats are using several types of 21-inch torpedoes; briefly:
An acoustic homing torpedo, the "Gnat"; (see paragraphs 10-29 below).
An electric torpedo, trackless, but short-ranged; (see paragraphs 40 to 61).
An air-driven torpedo, long-ranged or fast; (see paragraphs 70 to 80).
3. The two latter types may be fired as straight torpedoes, or may have a to-and-fro "Curly" setting (paragraphs 90 to 114).
4. All three types may be used with magnetic non-contact or impact pistols.


(ii) "GNAT" Torpedo.
10. German name "T.5".
THe following is a synthetic appreciation built on evidence.
11. The "Gnat" is a 21-inch electric-driven acoustic homing torpedo, and therefore trackless.
12. Although primarily an anti-escort weapon it has not been confined to these targets.
13. It can be fired from the bow or stern tubes of a U-Boat, on the surface or down to a depth of about 100 feet.
14. Normal gyro angling, probably up to 90°, can be applied.
15. Its speed is probably 24 knots, and range about 6,000 yards. It may run on for some time at a tailing off speed before finally sinking. The overall duration of its run cannot exceed 15 minutes.
16. If at any time during the "Gnat's" listening run it should come within receptive range of sound from its target, acoustic control will override its straight running or circling control, and it will close its target on a curve pursuit.
17. This receptive range will of course depend on the sound output of the target and on background noise, but it is of the order of 300 yards from an escort doing 15 knots.
18. The curve of pursuit course is such that the first crossing of the target's track must be close astern of the source of the sound. The position of a subsequent hit depends on a large number of factors, but will tend to be on the after part of the vessel, the more so as her speed approaches the speed of the "Gnat" torpedo.
19. It probably does a straight safety range run, of about 700 yards, and then begins to "listen".
20. By an external tube setting spindle the "Gnat" may be pre-set so that, after the safety range is run off, it will behave in one of three ways, which are not fully known:
(i) suitable for an approaching target; possibly circling;
(ii) suitable for a retiring target;
(iii) to run as a normal straight torpedo, with acoustic control cut out.
21. The particulars of the "Gnat's" acoustic control are uncertain, but there are grounds for thinking that a noise decoy on each quarter affords much better protection than one alone.
22. Operative acoustic frequency is not known, but is probably between 1 and 50 k.c.
23. The Gnat" is probably unaffected by Asdic, and almost certainly cannot home on Asdic transmission.
24. The turning circle of the "Gnat" when in acoustic control (as opposed to when doing a pre-set "lurking" circle) will be as small as can be designed. A turning circle diameter of about 150 yards is likely.
25. The pistol in the "Gnat" is believed to be in a top pocket in the warhead. This is probably a sensitive impact pistol of the inertia type. Almost certainly the "Gnat" has magnetic non-contact firing in addition.
26. The depth keeping gear probably has the range of settings down to 40 feet common to German torpedoes, but the depth setting used against escort vessels is likely to be about 15 feet.
27. The warhead charge in the "Gnat" is thought to be about 600 lbs.
28. It is uncertain whether the "Gnat" is fitted with a self-destructor or not. If so it might either detonate the warhead, or less noisily wreck the mechanism.
29. The explosion of a "Gnat" may therefore, it is thought, be caused in any of the following ways:
Impact hit on its target.
Non-contact hit.
By wake effect close under a ship's stern.
By perturbation in a rough sea, causing a premature of its magnetic pistol.
By effects of a nearby depth charge, firing either its magnetic or inertia pistol.
By perturbation when sinking unsteadily at the end of its run, which might be a deep explosion without plume.
By self-destructor gear, possibly.



NOTE: These reports which where released monthly and condensed in Overviews was on a need to know basis and destroyed afterwards so no complete issues are found within the public domain. Probably they touched upon cross overs of RN Research at that time. For future naval researchers of WW2 "Battle of the Atlantic" your hope is in the unlocking and release of any within MOD RN NID Archives.

tbc..

[Bordegar]

Today seems the day for long patrols and little rewards for me so i thought i would post this tale taken from the memoirs of Teddy Suhren, Ace of Aces: Memoirs of a U-Boat Rebel a good read and recommended for its salty tales.


In the summer of 1942 Teddy Sehren took U-564 on a long cruise around the Caribbean that lasted over 10 weeks. The intelligence gained it was hoped that an extended patrol would gain rich pickings of weakly defended ships that had been experienced since the USA had entered the war. Here the plans of mice and men once again was put on hold as events unfolded.

Orders being sent for longer patrols called for them to be resupplied from a ‘milch cow’ U boat whilst at sea, even transferring new torpedoes from boat to boat in a difficult and risky operation as they narrowly missed being bombed when his crew failed to spot an aircraft. This being due to long days at surface and blindness from sun and crystal sea states. He took the decision to only surface at night afterwards i quote

I decide to remain submerged during the day. Otherwise the watch on the bridge have to remain alert to everything and the demands on them are too great. It is too much for the men. The grilling sun, the brightness on the sea, the blistering heat, all combine to make the concentration seize up. Conditions in the Caribbean are quite different to those in the Atlantic. I shall avoid taking any risks, and dive by day. In the safety of the deep I can rely on the listening-room, which can let me know of any propeller noise, and the crew can relax. And even if the sweat does trickle from every pore, at least the water isn’t too cold!

At night we surface, and my place is on the bridge. I am in the middle of a watch one night, when the same thing happens again. Another boat reports a contact: convoy in quadrant so- and-so, speed 10 knots, course northeast. According to Navigation Station the convoy should be in sight round about 05.00 local time, so I go below and have a lie down. The radio operator is supposed to wake me at the right time. Later, around 03.00, I wake up, turn over and try to go back to sleep. But I begin to wonder why I am so wide awake if nothing is up? On the bridge a cool wind blows in my face and freshens me up as we cruise.

‘Have you seen anything? ‘No, not a thing? There’s still a bit of time to go. I take a look through the glasses, as a matter of routine since nothing is happening. A glance behind us and I am thunderstruck. That has to be … ‘Look, you lot the entire convoy is steaming along behind us; it’s just about on top of us! What the devil’s happened to your eyes?’

The WO and the look-outs gaze in the direction I mean, but they can’t make anything out. I give orders to turn in that direction, and after a while the silhouettes appear over the horizon; I can clearly see the escorts. Either my crew have gone blind, or they are not used to the tropics! But now isn’t the time to discuss it.

The sky’s just beginning to turn grey, and with the short dawn in the tropics it will soon be light. So I give orders to dive, and settle down again. The convoy steams on as though pulled on a string. It’s day- light now. The torpedoes are ready, the four tubes are trained on the freighters. Range 1,200m. We send off the first. We clearly hear a loud bang – but no detonation. The other eels don’t work either.

One of the freighters stops and I see through the periscope the crew bending over the rails amidships. There doesn’t seem to be any damage, otherwise the ship wouldn’t still be hanging about as a target. They must be looking at the place where the torpedo has hit them: but it’s not gone off.

The four torpedoes that we went to all that trouble to get on board in the Atlantic are duds. The complicated mechanics of a torpedo – control system, rudder mechanism and detonator – simply couldn’t stand jolts as hard as those inflicted by the bombs dropped from the plane.

Acknowledgment in full to Teddy Suhren, Ace of Aces: Memoirs of a U-Boat Rebel

[Bordegar]

Part One

Admiral Doenitz published personal thoughts with instructions on tactics and technical advances on both sides in the Battle of the Atlantic () An insight to operational decision covering December 1941 to April 1943

The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, was a complete surprise to Germany's political and military leaders. It also resulted in a state of war between the United States of America and Germany. Conditions for U-boat warfare in the North Atlantic were once again clarified. Limiting factors vis-a-vis North America ceased to operate. The bar against German U-boats entering American waters was raised by the political leaders and in December the U-boat command equipped the first six U-boats which were to operate in American waters as near to the coast as possible. Additional U-boats were, unfortunately, not available because we did not have advance warning of the Japanese attack. The total number of U-boats ready for service was still small, and a larger monthly rate of increase could be expected only in the spring of 1942.

The success of the first six boats in American waters was, as expected, very considerable. The American defense was inexperienced; on the other hand, the U-boat commanders were exceptionally experienced. It was possible to operate very near to the coast and on the surface. Traffic was heavy here; consequently, the results were great. The U-boat command, therefore, sent every boat available for operations in American waters to this area in order to profit by the favorable situation, but a reduction in these great successes was expected to set in after a few months. Such, however, was not the case. Until the end of September 1942 such operations were worth while despite the very long inoperative passage out and back. The area of operations was, moreover, so extensive that it was still worth while to operate in the Mona Passage or off Aruba or Trinidad when, as a result of strong defenses, operations off Cape Hatteras became too difficult.

Compared with 1941, each U-boat was economically valuable, even if, as already stated, its value had diminished, despite the great successes, to one-tenth of the 1940 figure. The large U-boat program ordered at the outbreak of war was in 1942 implemented only to the extent of 10 percent of the expected figure. Had the political leaders before the war recognized England as a probable opponent, and had they in 1937 prepared for a war with England and constructed a large U-boat fleet, the number of U-boats available in 1942 would have been available in 1940 but with 10 times greater results. The political desire of Germany's leaders not to make war against England and the corresponding armament policy of the navy led to our not having the requisite U-boats available at the right time or in the right numbers.

In order to increase sinkings wherever possible, the U-boat command used the long approach route and sailed in a group the boats which were to operate in North American waters. They followed roughly on a great circle course in a wide rake-like formation. In this way convoy traffic was often unexpectedly encountered. Apparently, the English convoy command had had to abandon the dispersal procedure used in 1941. This great circle procedure continued throughout the whole summer and autumn of 1942, convoys being attacked again and again and dispersed by U-boat packs lying in wait. The 1939 building program developed in such a way that, by late autumn, 42 boats were available for American waters, for operations against Cape Town, for three convoy attacking groups in northern waters, in the North and Central Atlantic, and often an additional group to attack the Gibraltar-England traffic.

Losses by antisubmarine warfare were small. The main enemy, particularly in relation to the tactical maneuverability of the U-boat on the surface, was the aircraft. As these had, however, apparently not yet been fitted with long-range location devices, they were only available to spot U-boats close at hand. In a rough sea, and particularly at night, aircraft were not dangerous. Depth-charge attacks by destroyers against U-boats were not much feared. They were dangerous only when the U-boat was not protected by a sufficient depth of water. In general, depth charges dropped by sight over the diving position were more accurate than the patterns dropped later on the basis of Asdic bearings.

A U-boat which lay low and left no oil traces generally was lost by its pursuer after a certain time and could surface under cover of night and escape. The U-boat crews had in the meantime gained excellent experience in repairing failures and leaks. Damage and failures which, in the early war years, would have forced the boat to surface and led to its destruction were now overcome underwater; and consequently the boat was saved. Proof was also given of the excellent construction of the boats, which was extraordinarily elastic by reason of the pressure hull sections having been welded, in contradistinction to the usual riveting process in the First World War. Thus, when depth charged, the boat shook but did not break. Provided the valves held, nothing could happen to the boat unless a depth charge exploded close by and caused the pressure hull to burst.

Generally speaking, therefore, the U-boat attack in 1942 was superior to the defense. The finding of convoys was facilitated by the large number of boats. The U-boat's greatest possession, the element of surprise, was still effective. The U-boats, when on the surface, were not spotted soon enough for the enemy to be able to avoid them; and, when attacking, they could not be detected early enough by surface or underwater means of detection.

The surprise Anglo-American landings in North Africa called for a concentration of U-boats on both sides of Gibraltar. Every U-boat that could reach these waters within 10 days was mustered. This resulted in a considerable reduction of tonnage sunk that was not made up by sinkings off Gibraltar. Defense in these African waters was very effective, particularly in the air, and U-boat losses were correspondingly high. Through this withdrawal of forces to the Mediterranean the Atlantic command suffered during the following months from a shortage of boats. This led to a reduction in the number of convoys sighted and consequently in the number of sinkings. Other grounds existed, however, for the renewed decrease in the number of convoys sighted during the winter of 1942-43.

In 1942, the German Cypher Office was fortunate enough to read various convoy ciphers. The German U-boat command thus had at its disposal the place and time of convoy meetings and also gathering points for convoy stragglers. This valuable assistance to attacking U-boats ceased in the early months of 1943. It was, of course, possible, given sufficiently large number of W/T messages, to break down the code, but advantage could no longer be derived from this, as the enemy was now changing the code at shorter intervals, so that the wearying labour of breaking it down had to be re-commenced each time. The secondary reason for this reduction in the tracking of convoys during the winter of 1942-43 may have been that, at this time, the enemy grasped the U-boat reconnaissance and patrol tactics and took avoiding action. If mobile operations employing the so-called wolfpack system of a number of submarines operating together on the surface were to be given up, it would be impossible to achieve the desired concentration on one convoy. In this respect, the same conditions apply to sea warfare as for land warfare. Here, also, no decisive results can be obtained by static trench warfare, but only by mobile operations.

The U-boat command, therefore, had to concentrate before the war on what means the enemy might employ to hinder U-boat movement on the surface and what could be done by us against his A/S measures. The enemy air force was at that time the greatest problem for the U-boat command and it was therefore surprising that it was only later that the enemy recognized and used this weapon as being the most effective means against the U-boat. The second anxiety at that time was the possibility of the development of surface detection. Possible available counters were: Protection for U-boats on the surface against radar beams; i.e., the absorption of such beams so that the transmitter, receiving no echoes, was unable to obtain a bearing; the development of a search receiver for enemy radar beams of all wave lengths, with a view to warning the U-boat in good time; and the development of our own detecting apparatus.

The U-boat command expected only small advantages from the latter, since the low altitude of the apparatus on the bridge would allow only a restricted range. The important point about this group of possibilities was that the U-boat was enabled, as it were, to assume a cloak of invisibility. During the following years the most varied experiments were carried out in this direction. They led to a clear recognition that, at the most, reduced but not total absorption of radar beams could be achieved. Another possibility to counter the development of surface detection was a complete change of tactics, i.e., to abandon surface tactics and to submerge the U-boats. This required, however, a high underwater speed and a great underwater radius of action. Without these properties the U-boat would have sunk in underwater warfare to a purely static instrument, and this would have meant a renunciation of the great results achieved by concentrating forces at the right place at the right time. However, in the years just before the war the development of a fast underwater U-boat was achieved. Very high underwater speeds were reached by means of the hydrogen-peroxide drive. Even before the war the U-boat command demanded the most energetic development of such a propulsion and such boats, but, unfortunately, it was found that much time was required and many set-backs were experienced. In the most successful months of the U-boat warfare in 1942, the U-boat command continually called for a speed-up of this development and for the building of faster U-boats. They had many meetings with the technicians to try to achieve this.

TBC..